layue13
05f8fad38a
Gatekeep evals / eval-floor (push) Successful in 8s
Add .github/workflows/gatekeep-pr.yml with uses: ./ and OPENROUTER_API_KEY from secrets. Forge-agnostic API helper for Gitea.
24 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
24 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
# Gatekeep security seed checklist
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Used in model prompts **and** the deterministic scanner (`action/scripts/security-scan.sh`).
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| Item | Deterministic scan | Model review |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Hardcoded secrets/tokens | Added-line regex | Yes |
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| Prompt injection via repo files | Instruction-override phrases in diff | Yes |
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| Auth bypass | Path globs (`**/auth/**`) floor high | Yes |
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| Unauthorized API access | — | Yes |
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| Billing logic bypass | Path globs (`**/billing/**`, `**/payment/**`) | Yes |
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| CI workflow tampering | `.github/workflows/**` → high + scan hit | Yes |
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| Unsafe deserialization | pickle/yaml.load/unserialize patterns | Yes |
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| SQL/command injection | Concat / `shell=True` patterns | Yes |
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## Blocking policy (default)
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`policy.json` → `security_agreement`: **`require_agreement_unless_scan_hard_fail`**
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- **Inline + block:** security / **Critical** findings where **≥2 models agree**, or any **deterministic scan hard-fail**.
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- **Summary only:** lone-model security flags (disputed) — do not inline; humans can still escalate.
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- Scan hard-fail always floors PR tier to **high** and fails check `gatekeep / security`.
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- Every finding (including security) still shows **severity + where + why it matters**.
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